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Why should we be interested in understanding the interactions of 
foreign assistance with the agricultural development of developing coun 
tries? First, because foreign assistance plays a major role in the expen 
ditures of low-income developing countries. In Africa currently, from 
30 percent to 60 percent of government expenditures in many coun 
tries come from foreign aid, and the share of government expenditures 
in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of African countries ranges from 
25 percent to 35 percent. Even in a large country such as India, at its 
peak foreign assistance constituted close to a quarter of the gross domestic 
investment.
Second, development of the agricultural sector plays an important 
role in the overall economic development of countries at early stages 
of development, and governments need to play an important role in 
developing agriculture due to the "public goods" nature of many in 
vestments such as agricultural research, extension and physical in 
frastructure. These investments require lumpy capital and skills for their 
development. Small farmers with low incomes cannot mobilize resources 
on their own on a scale needed to establish such infrastructure, especially 
as the benefits derived from such investments have long gestation lags. 
Besides, they are not easily captured and recovered through direct cost 
recovery, hence the important role for government at early stages of 
development.
I am grateful to Paul Fishstein for research assistance and to Kirn Tran for typing the paper.
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Third, the contribution of foreign assistance to government activity 
consists not simply of financial transfers, but also of the transfer of ideas 
in the form of policy advice, skills provided through technical assistance 
which accompanies investment decisions, and institutional development 
through such means as the transfer of western "models," as for in 
stance the U.S.-type land-grant colleges for agricultural research and 
extension. These various nonfinancial transfers can have a profound 
effect on the efficiency with which financial resources are utilized by 
the recipient countries and thus on the pace of growth of production 
and productivity. The level, stability and content of foreign assistance 
are strongly influenced by the international economic and political en 
vironment. It is important to explore the important dimensions of this 
environment to see its impact on the nature of foreign assistance as well 
as on its effectiveness.
The process of agricultural development is, however, in large measure 
determined by the resource endowments, policies, institutions and 
technological possibilities in the recipient countries. The extent to which 
an environment conducive to agricultural development exists depends 
largely on the way policymakers in developing countries perceive the 
role of the agricultural sector, and the extent to which they put in place 
the means to foster development.
The African situation offers a good example of the interaction be 
tween domestic and international factors. The problems of African coun 
tries' agricultural sectors have been at the center of international atten 
tion since the late 1970s because of the broadly shared international 
view that domestic policy failures largely explain their slow pace of 
development. Much "aid weariness" has developed because of the 
perceived failure of foreign aid to solve the problems of agricultural 
development in Africa. In the 1950s and 1960s, countries in Asia went 
through similar periods of balance-of-payments crises resulting from 
the failures of their agricultural exports and increased food (and in 
dustrial) imports. They too were seen to be increasing their dependence 
on food and financial aid from developed countries and there did not 
seem to be any hope of their ever being able to reach the stage of food 
self-sufficiency and sustained agricultural growth. Many of them, such
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as India, Pakistan, Indonesia and even Bangladesh, have now reached 
a position of food self-sufficiency, and some (e.g., India, Pakistan and 
Indonesia) have become modest exporters of food. Important insights 
can be derived from the experience of Asia regarding the content of 
foreign aid, and especially the way it affected domestic policies, resource 
endowments and institutions, which in turn enabled Asian countries to 
develop agriculture. It is interesting to consider whether parallel 
possibilities exist in Africa.
There has been reluctance to indulge in such comparative analysis 
on grounds that few useful lessons can be learned from Asian countries 
which had far superior initial endowments in the form of trained man 
power and institutional capacity. These may not be reproduceable in 
the African countries. A great deal of foreign aid to Africa, on the other 
hand, has already involved a relatively simplistic application of far more 
advanced western technologies, institutions and changing conceptions 
of development. The effects of aid from OECD countries to African 
agriculture over the last quarter-century constitute the subject of a ma 
jor research project under my direction. Also, in providing such aid, 
frequently the wrong lessons have been learned from the Asian ex 
perience and applied to the African continent. For instance, the Indian 
type of complex, centralized, multisectoral planning models were trendy 
in the 1960s and were applied in Nigeria's early plans by western ad 
visors. Concern about increased inequalities following the Green Revolu 
tion in Asia resulted in donors in the 1970s placing an excessive em 
phasis in Africa on integrated agricultural development of the regions 
and populations with few resources and growth possibilities in the short 
run. Such investment in agricultural and rural development resulted in 
a large number of failed projects leading neither to growth nor equity. 
Similarly, the concerns about the growing ranks of the educated 
unemployed derived from the Asian experience in the 1970s lead the 
international development community to underrate the fundamental im 
portance of investment in education and training in African countries 
in the advice and investments they offered.
Since the technological, institutional, skilled manpower and physical 
resource endowments of many Asian countries are closer to those of
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Africa in some respects than the solutions derived directly either from 
the West or from these various western perceptions of the relevance 
of the Asian experience to Africa, it might be fruitful to make direct 
comparisons between the two continents to determine more precisely 
where lessons are transferable and where they are not. For instance, 
semi-aridness is a major reason for Africa's poor agricultural perfor 
mance. India has two-thirds of the world's cultivable area that is classified 
as semi-arid and Africa has one-third. It is instructive, therefore, to 
examine where growth in agricultural production occurred in India and 
why, and to examine the implications for Africa's prospects in semi- 
arid agriculture. Similarly, small-scale irrigation and low-level 
agricultural technology used extensively in Asia can benefit Africa in 
place of the tractorized schemes and large-scale irrigation dams financed 
by foreign aid to date. As a prototype of the Asian case, I will explore 
the sources of growth in India's agriculture, the causes of that growth, 
and the role that foreign aid has played in that process to derive in 
sights for the development of African agriculture. To do so, I first review 
the international economic environment which currently determines the 
level, size and sources of foreign aid to Africa and which influenced 
these levels in India. I then outline briefly the motivations of aid as they 
determine the type and certainty of aid. This in turn influences the ex 
tent to which recipient country policymakers feel that they can rely on 
external financing as a source of government expenditures. I then ex 
amine the role of agriculture in economic development. Afterwards, 
by reviewing India's agricultural development experience and the role 
of foreign assistance in the process, I identify the sources of India's 
agricultural growth and the causes of that growth. I then examine the 
similarities and differences in the domestic policy environments and 
aid between the African countries and India to draw implications from 
the comparative experience for future agricultural development in Africa.
The International Environment for Aid
The rapid growth in agricultural production in North America, Europe 
and Japan since the mid-1970s has greatly increased the world surplus
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stocks of grain in the 1980s. This situation is radically different from 
the period in the 1960s when India was the major beneficiary of con 
cessional aid. Then the United States was the only major source of 
surplus food and foreign aid and thus the dominant source of advice, 
institutional innovations and new technological possibilities introduc 
ed in the agricultural sector in India. The sources of aid to the develop 
ing world have greatly diversified since then, as has the prosperity among 
western nations. For instance, a large number of Western European 
countries and Japan as well as Eastern Bloc countries are giving con 
cessional assistance to Africa. Consequently, ideas in the form of policy 
advice, investments, and institutional and technological possibilities and 
skills introduced through foreign aid into African agriculture are highly 
diverse, frequently creating much confusion on the African scene. This 
is especially the case as the ability of African governments to distinguish 
between the quality of advice and assistance is greatly limited due to 
their own limited capacity in terms erf trained manpower and institutions.
While the sources and levels of food and financial aid have increased 
steadily until the early 1980s, they also contain the danger of providing 
a false sense of security to the recipients, reducing the urgency of deal 
ing with domestic policies which often inhibit the development of 
agriculture. Concessional aid levels to Africa have declined from 1984 
levels as a result of concern about aid effectiveness and also the reces 
sionary trends in OECD countries. Willingness of the African govern 
ments to adjust their domestic policies has in turn been influenced by 
their concern about the decline in aid level and also by the need for 
increased national self-reliance. The differing views of the diverse donors 
adds to the confusion on policy adjustments in Africa.
While the broad general directions of policy reforms are clear enough, 
there is much disagreement as to the speed with which such reforms 
can be implemented, the size of benefits that will ensue from the reforms 
and the speed with which the benefits will accrue. The large agricultural 
surpluses of the OECD countries have changed the international markets 
and prices by causing a downward pressure on world agricultural prices; 
this has been reinforced by the countries in Asia becoming exporters, 
a situation which did not exist in the 1960s. Developing countries of
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Africa on the one hand face lower real prices for their agricultural ex 
ports due to these surpluses of commodities such as sugar, edible oil, 
etc., and on the other hand suffer from the competition of low-cost im 
ported cereals. Meanwhile, their own domestic food production con 
stitutes the major source of employment and income for a great ma 
jority of their populations, with over 60 percent of their cultivated area 
under cereal production. Cheap food imports can increase the real in 
comes of urban populations, but by depressing internal terms of trade 
they can reduce the incomes of agricultural producers in developing 
countries, especially if there is no growth in the productivity of their 
agriculture to compensate for these price declines. If African countries, 
in addition, face large deficits in their balance of payments resulting 
from a combination of their own failed import-substituting industrializa 
tion policies of the 1970s and also the recessionary world market forces 
referred to above which have reduced the prices of their exports, this 
explains the need for macroeconomic reform in their countries to ad 
just to the changing world market. An increase in the domestic 
agricultural factor productivity which will reduce the cost of African 
production and make it more competitive with cheap agricultural im 
ports or exports of competitors is thus the most important way to avert 
further decline in the real incomes of African countries.
Motivations of Aid
Aid is prompted by many reasons. Recipients have preferred to think 
of aid much in the way that Senator Fulbright considered it, namely, 
as a form of progressive international taxation in which a small share 
of the income of high-income countries is mobilized and transferred 
to their low-income counterparts for the latter's development. Since 
developing countries are dependent on primary commodity exports, the 
prices of which fluctuate more than those of manufactured goods and 
services exported by developed countries, these countries have argued 
for aid so as to stabilize their export income. The concept of aid as 
a form of income transfer, however, has not had a broad appeal in the
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United States, although a large majority tends to be in favour of emergen 
cy aid on humanitarian grounds. Public opinion surveys show, for in 
stance, that while 79 percent of those interviewed in the U.S. approv 
ed of emergency aid only 49 percent supported long-term development 
assistance.
Aid, is course, also given by developed countries to meet their 
strategic, military or foreign policy concerns. In the case of aid pro 
grams of the United States, this has often resulted in assistance being 
highly concentrated on a few countries of the world, regardless of their 
developmental needs. U.S. aid levels to specific countries have also 
been quite unstable, depending on changes in those foreign policy or 
strategic considerations. Aid given to create long-term markets for the 
goods and services produced in the developed countries has more recently 
simply resulted in the disposal of surpluses existing in the OECD coun 
tries in the form of commodities, trained manpower or underutilized 
industrial capacity. Such desire for surplus disposal frequently results in 
tying of financial aid to the supply of equipment or trained manpower 
of the donor country, which may not be the most desirable for the 
development of recipient countries.
Motivations for aid may thus greatly affect the size, as well as the 
form and stability, of aid. Aid-giving countries may also refuse to share 
the secrets of their success so as to avoid future competition from reci 
pients. Aid may thus increase dependence of recipients in the short run 
without the possibility of its leading to self-reliance in the long run. 
This is, of course, a greater problem with bilateral than multilateral 
aid such as that of the World Bank, which is not tied to a particular 
source and is not related to strategic and military interests of individual 
countries.
Interaction of Foreign Aid with Domestic Policies
We now move on to consider the interaction of the level, form and 
stability of aid with the motivations for aid and its effects on the domestic 
policies of recipient countries by taking the example of India. Nearly 
60 percent of the $10 billion of U.S. aid received by India between 1949
54 Lele
and 1982 was given in the form of food aid, another 20 percent in the 
form of nonproject aid, and only 17 percent in the form of project loans. 
Bilateral assistance by the U.S. to India was relatively low until about 
1958, accelerated sharply to a peak in about 1968, and then declined 
sharply, especially from about 1972, to the point of becoming insignifi 
cant. Given its large size (750 million population), aid levels to India, 
on a per capita basis, have been very low at their peak in 1965-66 
being $2.6 compared to $20 to $50 per capita in many African coun 
tries currently. Only about 12 percent of these expenditures was on 
agricultural projects, most of a small-scale nature. 1 This situation is 
in contrast to that of many African countries in several ways. First, 
in Africa not only is the overall level of aid much higher, but the 
dependence on food aid is very small in comparison with India's. Food 
aid constitutes only about 10 percent of total aid to Africa, compared 
to over 50 percent of U.S. assistance to India. Much of the aid is in 
the form of financial aid and also in the form of projects. In contrast, 
much of the U.S. assistance to India was in the form of commodity 
or program aid and only a small amount in project aid. Project aid in 
Africa has tended to tax the limited planning and implementation capacity 
of the countries, as the resources devoted to developing such capacity 
further have been relatively limited, unlike in India. Also, quite a signifi 
cant amount of technical assistance has been provided to help in the 
implementation of projects. It is estimated that close to $4 billion were 
committed by OECD countries in the form of technical assistance to 
Africa during the 1970s.
Relatively little of this technical assistance has been allocated to im 
proving domestic policy, planning and implementation capacity. Indeed, 
much of the "learning by doing" has involved the technical assistance 
staff and, due to their short tenures, there has been much loss of learn 
ing by doing. This is an especially serious problem given that African 
countries start from a poorer initial base of trained manpower and in 
stitutional development that did India. In India, only about 1,400 U.S. 
agricultural advisors are estimated to have resided on a long-term basis 
from 1952 to 1973, and never more than 150 advisors at any given point 
in time. Only about 3,200 Indians were trained in agricultural and natural
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resource issues during this period. These numbers do not seem large 
in relation to India's size and needs. Yet there is a general belief that 
the U.S. made an important contribution to India's agricultural 
development.
I argue in this paper that it is the quality and the form of assistance 
which was the basis of this contribution and it is the nature of the in 
teraction of aid with domestic agricultural and overall policy which ex 
plains the success. The contributions appear to be in the form of: 
(1) developing of indigenous human and institutional capacity for 
agricultural research, policy, planning and evaluation, and (2) input into 
the formation and implementation of an overall agricultural policy which 
would be conducive to growth. We will stress that the initiative for im 
proved policy and planning ultimately came from India. The successive 
droughts, increased dependence on foreign aid and external interference 
in domestic policy affairs from about 1958, when foreign aid accelerated, 
until about 1965 when it reached a crescendo for India to reform its 
agricultural policies and to put in place a package of internally consis 
tent reforms which would increase production led to this initiative. Good 
luck also played a part. Apart from India's obviously better institutional 
and trained manpower base, the existence of technologies it could im 
port as well as the institutional models for technology generation it could 
borrow and install at home made a difference to its prospects. Finally 
and of considerable importance, India had been experimenting with dif 
ferent policies since the early 1950s and there was much accumulated 
learning through this process; when the crisis arose in the mid-1960s, 
India was able to utilize this valuable learning experience. We will show 
that these preconditions are not enjoyed by Africa to the same extent.
Until about 1963, India pursued a growth strategy which stressed an 
import-substituting industrialization policy in which agriculture had a 
relatively small role. During the first three plan periods the proportion 
of investments going to the agricultural sector ranged between 6 per 
cent to 10 percent. India has been broadly criticized for keeping its 
agricultural prices low prior to 1967. 2 Our analysis indicates that In 
dian prices were well above world market prices for wheat between 
1957 to 1972, however, even when measured in real effective exchange
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rates (see Figure 3). Only in the case of rice were prices below interna 
tional prices prior to 1967.
Programs for the development of agriculture, however, tended to focus 
on community development and extension programs aimed at convinc 
ing farmers to adopt modern technology. But the most important factor 
to be emphasized is that the physical response of production to fertilizers 
was relatively low for the traditional varieties of wheat and rice (Desai 
had estimated fertilizer response coefficients of 12kg per 1kg of nutrient 
for irrigated wheat under local conditions, the equivalent coefficients 
being lOkgs for rice). It is noteworthy that despite the impressive an 
nual growth rate of nutrient use of 19.8 percent annually, the average 
annual rate of growth for foodgrain output was about 3 percent per year 
during this period and there were substantial year-to-year fluctuations 
in overall production that tended to be influenced largely by weather. 
Dependence on imports had increased to meet domestic food re 
quirements. Figure 1 shows the domestic availability of food grains in 
cluding the rising imports in the mid-1960s. Figures 2 and 3 show the 
relationship of domestic to international prices of rice and wheat in In 
dia and illustrate the less favorable treatment of rice in terms of inter 
national prices as well as relative to wheat. Figure 4 shows the growth 
of fertilizer use in India. While India's dependence on financial assistance 
had increased by 1958 as a result of a foreign exchange gap created 
by an ambitious second plan and aggravated by the persistent need for 
commercial food imports, by 1966 net food imports had grown to over 
10 million tons.
The role of price policy reform vis-a-vis other agricultural policies 
is worth considering in the context of India's agricultural growth since 
1967. President Johnson believed that India was not serious about an 
agricultural policy reform. Further support for India's development by 
the U.S. and the World Bank, which had begun to emerge as a major 
donor, was contingent on India's devaluating its currency as well as 
a package of policies for the agricultural sector including increased pro 
ducer prices for rice and wheat, increased imports of fertilizers and pro 
motion of their role for the private sector and concentration among the 
progressive farmers in high potential areas, and support of prices for
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Figure 1 
Availability of Foodgrains in India
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the agricultural sector by a newly established food corporation of India 
becoming the buyer and seller of last resort. Many of these policies 
are similar to those now being advocated in African countries. It has 
generally been the U.S. belief that the imposition of these conditions 
on India in the mid-1960s as a prerequisite for receiving financial 
assistance from the U.S. and the World Bank, codified in the "Treaty 
of Rome" between the Indian minister of agriculture and the U.S. 
secretary of agriculture, had a profound impact on India's food situation.
Indeed, frequently the 1965 episode in India is cited in the context 
of the current discussion on policy reform in Africa, suggesting that 
achievement of the same policy reform in Africa, if necessary through 
the same type of conditionality, might solve Africa's problems.
There are, however, several important differences between the In 
dian and African cases which are worth highlighting. 3 First, much of 
the productivity growth in India occurred under irrigated conditions. 
In contrast, only 6 percent of the area under cultivation in Africa is 
irrigated. Not only was India's initial base of irrigated agriculture larger 
(18 percent of the area under cultivation being irrigated), but the new 
high-yielding technologies induced further investment in irrigation. Sec 
ond, the high-yielding rice and wheat varieties used in India were the 
result of major technological breakthroughs which had occurred in the 
international agricultural research institutes. In the case of wheat, this 
resulted in a Nobel Peace prize for its discoverer. Estimated response 
coefficients of high-yielding wheat under irrigated conditions are 20kgs 
per kg of nutrient, or 66 percent larger than under traditional varieties 
and of rice 15kgs, or 50 percent higher than traditional varieties.
Even then, the political decision to concentrate the use of fertilizer 
in limited areas of high potential was a difficult decision for the Indian 
government. I have documented elsewhere that there was internal op 
position to this approach from almost every important Indian lobby, 
including the intellectuals, the communists, the state governments, who 
would not gain from such concentration, the planning commission, 
because it would require increased foreign exchange, etc. Nevertheless, 
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Most important, with the assistance of the Rockefeller and Ford Foun 
dations and the U.S. government, India had been attempting to build 
up its agricultural research system starting as early as the late 1940s. 
The food crisis, however, provided the basis for pushing through dif 
ficult policy decisions with regard to the research system's reorganiza 
tion that had been stalled for nearly 20 years due to the internal resistance 
to reform. Therefore with the advent of the food crisis, India was able 
to put into operation an effective research system. This made the subse 
quent adjustments to continue to maintain its productivity gains possi 
ble. Such an adaptive research capability is particularly important in 
the case of crops which encounter highly diverse growing conditions 
and which therefore require a high degree of local adaptation. This was 
the case with regard to rice. The Indian research system was ultimately 
able to issue 221 varieties of rice to address the many diverse adoption 
problems faced in the promotion of new rice varieties.
Table 1 shows that irrigated wheat alone accounted for an astonishing 
99 percent of the increase in productivity during the 1968-69 to 1981-82 
period. Rice contributed another 15 percent. During the earlier 1956-57 
to 1968-69 period, wheat and rice had contributed 89 and 79 percent 
respectively to increased productivity. Because the contribution of other 
rainfed crops to the overall growth in production such as millet, sorghum, 
maize, etc., which are the dominant crops in Africa as well, was nil 
or negative (meaning the area under cultivation of these crops declined 
due to competition of higher productivity crops), the combined con 
tribution of wheat and rice accounted for over 100 percent of aggregate 
productivity growth. There was a complex input substitution with the 
new technology. In the rainfed areas, the new technology increased pro 
ductivity from irrigation more and the spread of minor irrigation, par 
ticularly from tubewells, was very rapid. Whereas tubewells accounted 
for only about 6 percent of irrigated area in 1960-61, they accounted 
for about 14 percent by 1970-71 and 20 percent in the mid-1970s. In 
the irrigated areas, use of fertilizer accelerated as the marginal produc 
tivity of fertilizer curve shifted upwards and flattened out at a much 
greater input level. But because use of fertilizer on rainfed areas grew 
slowly, total fertilizer use increased at an annual rate of about 12 per 
cent, slower than before. It is noteworthy that the foodgrain produc-
Table 1
Crop-Wise Contributions of Individual Effects to the Change 















































































































































































































































































( ) Indicates percent of the sum of the effects for the period.
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tion growth rate accelerated to 3.5 percent annually during 1965-66 to 
1976-77, despite the deceleration in fertilizer growth rate by over 40 
percent to 12 percent annually. This would suggest an improved effi 
ciency of fertilizer use brought about by two related factors: technical 
change in the form of the new grain varieties with higher fertilizer 
response coefficients and an acceleration in the rate of growth of ir 
rigation (table 2) induced by the enhanced profitability of the new 
varieties.
Table 2
Growth Rates for Foodgrain Production, Fertilizer Use 
and Irrigated Area
Foodgrains Fertilizer Irrigated area
Period

























SOURCES: "Area and Production of Principal Crops in India," Government of India; "Fer 
tilizer Statistics," The Fertilizer Association of India.
NOTES: Information on foodgrain production was available only through 1983-84. Information 
on irrigated area was availably only through 1981-82. "Annual" refers to a simple yearly series, 
while "3-yr. avg." refers to a three-year moving average series. Irrigated area rates use an an 
nual series.
Finally, since the U.S. was the only supplier of food and since its 
reserves were declining rapidly, India realized that, should a deficit arise, 
increased reliance on the U.S. for food imports was likely to be un 
wise, as it would result in increased world food prices given India's 
large food import requirements. It was also injurious to national pride, 
as it would compromise India's pursuit of an independent foreign policy 
because of the dependence on scarce U.S. stocks. Thus Indian 
policymakers were able to overcome a number of formidable domestic
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obstacles to reform, although the individuals involved in the reform paid 
a substantial cost. (Mr. Subramaniam, the minister of agriculture, for 
instance, lost the election in 1967 because of a perception that he had 
become too pro-American.)
The current discussion of macroeconomic and sectoral policy condi 
tionally tied to financial aid of donors in Africa, as well as the increas 
ed food imports, are reminiscent of India's situation for those involved 
in such assistance earlier. Nevertheless, many differences exist, although 
many African countries have devaluated, revised their food prices and 
liberalized fertilizer imports and distribution as did India. There have 
been relatively few technological breakthroughs in the case of crops 
grown in the semi-arid areas of either Africa or India, however. The 
exception is hybrid maize, which has shown impressive growth in many 
parts of Africa where similar effective services in the form of timely 
fertilizer supply, extension and output marketing facilities have been 
available. Some technological possibilities exist, but require effective 
adaptation of varieties and practices to local conditions such as that done 
by the Indian research system in the case of rice earlier. The national 
research systems of most African countries, with the exception of Zim 
babwe and Kenya, have not shown the capacity to organize adaptive 
research programs which would lead to the production of more suitable 
planting material.
Unlike in India, donors who have focused on project aid until recently 
have neglected the development of national research systems; contrary 
to much conventional wisdom on the subject, they have assumed that 
borrowing technology from the international research systems and con 
ducting on-farm adoptive research without building the national research 
system which will carry out effective on-station research will address 
the problem. They have therefore not invested in either the develop 
ment of national research systems or in the training of nationals on the 
scale necessary. Now that national research systems have been recogniz 
ed to be a critical bottleneck, however, all donors, who often have con 
flicting ideas as to what research to conduct and how, have begun to 
focus on the systems, creating much competition and confusion in the 
African countries, especially given the limited resources they can bring 
to bear.
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The implications of food surplus in the world must also be considered 
here in their effect on motivation to address policy problems in Africa. 
Food aid is relatively easily available to African governments, whose 
food import requirements are small. Therefore, they have not yet at 
tached the degree of priority to the long-run development of their own 
science and technology capacity and to the improvement of their 
agricultural delivery systems to experience sustained growth in produc 
tion and productivity. Although some are experimenting with policy 
reform, attempts at policy reform are by themselves unlikely to solve 
the problem. Even in encouraging policy reform, however, the donors 
have not yet begun to program their assistance to create the long-run 
policy planning capacity in African governments. Such emphasis on 
capacity building is needed, given the fact that African countries start 
with a poorer initial base.
The contrast between India and Africa shows that the nature and the 
severity of external shocks can make a difference in the extent to which 
policy makers in developing countries are willing to undertake reform. 
In India's case, however, both good planning and good luck played a 
much more important role than is generally acknowledged. India's own 
trained manpower and domestic economic planning ability could be 
harnessed in a period of crisis. The small number of donors helping 
India placed emphasis on strengthening India's policy making, implemen 
tation and technological capacity.
These comparisons reinforce the point frequently made in the case 
of African agriculture, namely, that the sources of stagnation of rain- 
fed agriculture are quite complex and will require a much longer time 
horizon to overcome. They will require a much more sustained effort 
than either donors or African governments are yet fully ready to 
undertake.
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